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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its Road Commission, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LLOYD STANGER and EDNA 
OLSON STANGER, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
11028 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
PREFACE 
Appellants seek a rehearing and a reconsideration 
of the opinion handed down in this matter by this Court 
on June 24, 1968. It is submitted that the opinion per-
petuated the errors committed by the lower court as to 
basic legal principles, and that it was premised on facts 
entirely contrary to those established at the jury trial. 
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Appellants further contend that the effect of the opin-
ion creates considerable confusion in the field of eminent 
domain law in the State of Utah in several respects. 
Furthermore, the basic issue of law presented to the 
Court was not clearly decided in a manner such as will 
furnish guidance in future cases of thi!) general type. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CONSEQUENTIAL AND SEVERANCE 
DAMAGES DO NOT BOTH EXIST IN ANY 
CASE INVOLVING A SINGLE PROPERTY, 
NOR IS IT THE PROVINCE OF A JURY TO 
SEGREGATE THE TWO TYPES OF DAM-
AGES. 
In its unanimous opinion this Court made the fol-
lowing comment -
"Someone certainly should tell the jury the 
cliff erence between the two types of damages -
one compensable and the other not." 
The foregoing statement, referring to severance 
damages and consequential damages, contains major 
errors under Utah condemnation law. In fact, the 
quoted sentence from the opinion is probably the key 
error from which several errors of law radiate. As 
pointed out in Appellants' Brief at page 10, and follow-
ing, if there has been a partial taking the entire pro-
ceeding as to damages to remaining properties is gov-
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erned by sub-section (2) of Section 78-34-10, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 - severance damages. On the 
other hand, if there is no underlying taking, then the 
proceedings and the type of damages recoverable come 
under sub-section (3) of the same statutory section -
consequential damages. In short, the two types of dam-
ages are mutually exclusive and can never be found in 
any litigation involving the same piece of property. 
There is absolutely no reason why in any case there 
should be any cause for a jury to segregate the two types 
of damages for the simple reason that the distinction is 
one to be decided by the Court as a matter of law. And, 
in cases involving the State of Utah, the matter of con-
sequential damages can never get before the jury since 
the entire proceeding is barred by the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity. Either the State of Utah is properly 
in court as to all damages, or it is not in court at all -
it is just that simple in eminent domain proceedings. 
If there has been no taking, then sovereign immunity 
operates to keep the matter clearly out of court in con-
sequential damage situations; if there has been an actual. 
taking, then the nature of the damages are severance, 
and all pertinent evidence is admissible. 
Perhaps the error into which this Court fell in the 
quoted statement can best be illustrated by taking the 
latter part of the statement, wherein mention is made 
that severance damages are compensable and consequen-
tial damages are not, and making an analysis of factual 
illustrations. To begin with, the statement that conse-
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quential damages are not compensable i_s clearly errone-
ous, except in situations where sovereign immunity is 
the basis for denying recovery. In the previously cited 
case of Board of Education of Logan City v. Croft 
(1962), 13 Utah 2d 310, 373 P. 2d 697, it was clearly 
pointed out that consequential damages definitely are 
compemable in cases where no actual taking has oc-
curred, if they meet certain requirements. A reading of 
that opinion and the basic law ~upporting it further 
points out the inconsistency of this Court's opinion in 
stating that the sovereign immunity " ... issue was never 
raised." When this Court stated that consequential 
damages are not compensable - apparently as applied 
to this case, it could only do ~o by invoking sovereign 
immunity. 
Perhaps another approach to illustrate this argu-
ment might help the Court. In the case of Springville 
Banking Company v. Burton ( 1960), 10 U. 2d 100, 349 
P. 2d 157, and the case of Fairclough v. Salt Lake 
County (1960), 10 U. 2d 417, 354 P. 2d 105, we actually 
had two cases involving consequential damages for the 
simple reason that there was no basic underlying taking 
such as would bring the governmental agencies into 
court. Now, let us assume that in both cases there was 
in fact an actual taking of a portion of the property 
owner's lands, classfying the type of damages in both 
instances as severance damages. Under such a situation 
had those two cases gone to trial we would have had a 
situation illustrative of the distinction which this Court 
might actually have had in mind. In the Springville 
4 
Banking case, since the nature of the damages was 
caused by the creation of traffic islands or dividers in 
the street, the trial court would have ruled, upon tlH; 
offer of evidence of such damage, that the damage was 
non-compewable - and that the evidence would not go 
to the jury at all. This would be so because the action 
taken was a function of the police power in regulating 
the flow of traffic. 
On the other hand, if we assume that there was an 
actual taking of a portion of the properties in the Fair-
clough case, the matter would have been. entirely differ-
ent since the taking and the construction of the project 
was tied to a substantial change of highway grade affect-
ing the property right of access. The nature of the 
damage under such facts would also be severance, but 
the evidence of loss of value to the remaining properties 
would be clearly admissible under our Utah cases and 
those of practically every other jurisdiction known to 
the writer, since this type of damage is compensable. 
Appellants suggest that the Court probably was 
confused in its statements attempting to distinguish 
sever~nce and consequential damages by attempting to 
consider compensable and non-compensable damages. 
In any event, the matter of distinguishing even com-
pensable and non-compensable damages - let alone 
severance and consequential damages - is never for 
the jury. The segregation and admissibility of any Jdnd 
of damages is always the province of the court itself! 
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As pointed out in Appellants' Brief filed in this 
matter, this Court has consistently and properly cate-
gorized consequential damages in its prior decisions. The 
impact of this decision leads one to believe that the 
clas~ification of consequential damages in the prior 
opinions of this Court was probably accidental. 'l'his is 
particularly so since the clear impression now exists as 
a result of this opinion that consequential damages and 
severance damages can in fact exist a!) to the same pro-
perty in the same litigation. If this is going to be the 
law in Utah then it is respectfully submitted that law-
yers and the courts are going to wander into a morass 
of confusion for a long time to come. 
If one reads the record in this case it will be readily 
apparent that appellants' witness gave te.stimony as to 
damages to their remaining properties which was pre-
mised solely on elements of damage which were properly 
compensable. There was no testimony relating to dam-
ages to the subject remaining properties based upon 
loss of the flow of traffic or similar non-compensable 
items. The verdict forms submitted by the Court served 
only to confuse the jury by requesting that they attempt 
to separate damages of two different types, and without 
giving any criteria whatsoever to the jury by which such 
damages could in fact be separated, if they so found. 
Further, the various illustrations given by the Court to 
the jury of situations where damages could not be re-
covered were completely foreign to the case and could 
only be calculated to influence the frame of mind of 
the jury against appellants. 
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POINT II 
DEFENDANTS' PROPERTY SUSTAIN-
ED DAMAGES AS A MATTER OF LA'V AND 
FACT. 
Although this Court'.s opinion proceeded from a 
statement that the case simply involved the taking of 
.23 of an acre of defendants' land so as to provide them 
with an access road for their benefit, such begs the 
point of the factual situation involved. The damages 
caused to the remaining properties of these defendants 
were primarily related to their easements of light and 
view (caused by the erection of a 17 foot earthen-fill 
overpass directly in front of their home) , and the loss 
of their direct access to a previously existing street 
which ran in front of their home and as to which they 
owned fee title to the center of the road (a right clearly 
recognized in this Court's prior decision in Utah Road 
Commission v. Hansen (1963), 14 U. 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 
917) . It was the loss of and damage to these rights 
which caused the damages in this case. 
Appellants again wish to call the Court's attention 
to the Utah cases and those of other jurisdictions which 
clearly recognize that damages sustained by remaining 
properties resutling from a change in grade. Factually, 
it is submitted that the Court in its opinion in this case 
avoided the factors causing damages to appellants' re-
maining properties, as well as the actual property rights 
taken. 
In this Court's opinion considerable emphasis was 
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placed on the contention that the jury found that " ... 
there were no damages at all - severance, con~equen­
tial or otherwise." Actually, it is rather easy to pick up 
such a statement out of context if this Court chooses 
to completely disregard the underlying facts, as will 
shortly be pointed out. However, in the next to the last 
paragraph of the opinion in this case a comment was 
made relative to conversation concerning neighbors t)uf-
fering no loss due to the construction of the freeway 
project. 
As pointed out and referenced in Appellants' Brief 
(p. 24, 26) the pattern of damage to neighboring pro- 1 
perties was brought into the lawsuit by the plaintiff in 
an attempt to show that others in the general vicinity 
had in fact sustained damages to their remaining pro-
perties similar in nature to those suffered by defendants. 
This evidence came into the litigation in form and testi-
mony exactly opposite to the impression given by the 
Court in the next to the last paragraph of its opinion. ' 
Further, the attempt to show similar damages to 0ther 
properties was introduced through the State's appraiser 
because his entire analysis of damages to defendants' 
properties was predicated upon a finding that the dam-
ages to their properties had to be different in kind from 
those sustained by neighboring properties. It was just 
this type of approach - completely opposite to the im-
pression secured by the Court in writing its opinion -
that gave the State's appraiser reason and basis for 
stating that the remaining properties of the defendants 
had in fact sustained no damages at all. 
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POINT III 
THIS COURT SHOULD CLEARLY RULE 
WHETHER THE FACTORS CONTRIBUT-
ING TO SEVERANCE DAMAGES IN AN 
EMINENT DOMAIN ACTION MUST BE 
SPECIAL AND UNIQUE FROM THOSE SUS-
TAINED BY OTHER PROPERTIES IN THE 
GENERAL NEIGHBORHOOD IN ORDER TO 
BE CONSIDERED. 
From a careful reading of the opinion it would 
appear rather clear that the basic issue submitted to 
this Court has not been answered in a manner which 
will be of assistance in future cases of this type. This 
Court comments upon the use of the word "uniqm;" as 
possibly having been unfortunate, but later in cm:isider-
ing the claimed inaccuracy in in.struction No. 7 raises 
a doubt as to whether the challenged portion of the 
instruction has merit. As such, it is submitted that the 
opinion as written leaves the issue entirely in the clouds 
and serves no assistance as to similar situations which 
will arise in the future. 
Whether severance damages must be special and 
unique from similar damages sustained by other pro-
perties in the general neighborhood who may or may not 
be in Court is a matter which this Court should clearly 
resolve. If it wishes to take a position contrary to every 
jurisdiction which has approached the matter, then such 
should be done. But the matter needs resolving and, if 
not clearly resolved at this time, will probably be before 
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the Court for a clear-cut determination in the near 
future. 
CONCLUSION 
As a lawyer primarily involved in trial work relat-
ing to eminent domain matters, the opinion in this case 
needs a complete revision. If this Court chooses to 
stand on its position relative to the facts asserted in its 
opinion, then that is clearly its province. But, as a mem-
ber of the Bar of the State of Utah sincerely interested 
in assisting this Court in establishing clear-cut legal 
principle_s in eminent domain cases so as to advance the 
administration of justice, this writer earnestly solicits 
the Court to review its opinion and to properly outline 
the legal principles governing cases such as this - even 
if it cannot be persuaded to change its decision in the 
instant case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN E. FULLER 
Attorney for Appellants 
15 East 4th South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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